

Introduction and Course Overview

CS/ECE 407

Today's objectives

Understand scope of the course

Know where to find course resources


Understand course responsibilities

Articulate methodology of modern
cryptography

What is cryptography?


1.1 Definition *Cryptography* is the study of mathematical techniques related to aspects of information security such as confidentiality, data integrity, entity authentication, and data origin authentication.

cryptology




cryptography

Use math to
protect information




cryptanalysis

Try to break
cryptography



What is this course *not* about?



In short...

We will use mathematics to build and understand **provably** secure systems that solve **particular** problems

Why Take CS/ECE 407?

Learn the core tools that underly internet security.

Gain an appreciation for how subtle security can be.

Build a stronger understanding of theoretical computer science.

Earn credit towards your degree...

Because it is fun and interesting!

Classic problem of Secure Communication

Classic Cryptography

Cryptography is a *very* old subject, but it was not until quite recently that we understood it could be grounded in solid mathematical principles

Substitution Cipher

```
message = cryptographyiscool
```


Substitution Cipher

a → J

b → Y

c → Z

d → K

e → C

f → I

...

message = cryptographyiscool

ciphertext = ZBGNRXPBJNDGQFZXXA

Substitution Cipher

a → J
b → Y
c → Z
d → K
e → C
f → I
...

message = cryptographyiscool
Encryption ↓
ciphertext = ZBGNRXPBJNDGQFZXXA

Substitution Cipher

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Encryption ↓ ciphertext = ZBGNRXPBJNDGQFZXXA
↑ Decryption

Substitution Cipher

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b → Y
c → Z
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e → C
f → I

...

message = cryptographyiscool

Encryption ↓

ciphertext = ZBGNRXPBJNDGQFZXXA

↑ Decryption

Notice: both sender and receiver need the “key”

Substitution Cipher

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...

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Encryption ↓
ciphertext = ZBGNRXPBJNDGQFZXXA
↑ Decryption

$26! \approx 2^{72}$ possible keys

Substitution Cipher

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message = cryptographyiscool
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↑ Decryption

$26! \approx 2^{72}$ possible keys

Broken! E.g., use frequency analysis!


Babington Plot, 1586



Mary, Queen of Scots



Queen Elizabeth I



Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems*

By C. E. SHANNON

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

THE problems of cryptography and secrecy systems furnish an interesting application of communication theory.¹ In this paper a theory of secrecy systems is developed. The approach is on a theoretical level and is intended to complement the treatment found in standard works on cryptography.² There, a detailed study is made of the many standard types of codes and ciphers, and of the ways of breaking them. We will be more concerned with the general mathematical structure and properties of secrecy systems.

The treatment is limited in certain ways. First, there are three general types of secrecy system: (1) concealment systems, including such methods as invisible ink, concealing a message in an innocent text, or in a fake covering cryptogram, or other methods in which the existence of the message is concealed from the enemy; (2) privacy systems, for example speech inversion, in which special equipment is required to recover the message; (3) "true" secrecy systems where the meaning of the message is concealed by cipher, code, etc., although its existence is not hidden, and the enemy is assumed to have any special equipment necessary to intercept and record the transmitted signal. We consider only the third type—concealment systems are primarily a psychological problem, and privacy systems a technological one.

Secondly, the treatment is limited to the case of discrete information, where the message to be enciphered consists of a sequence of discrete symbols, each chosen from a finite set. These symbols may be letters in a language, words of a language, amplitude levels of a "quantized" speech or video signal, etc., but the main emphasis and thinking has been concerned with the case of letters.

The paper is divided into three parts. The main results will now be briefly summarized. The first part deals with the basic mathematical structure of secrecy systems. As in communication theory a language is considered to

* The material in this paper appeared originally in a confidential report "A Mathematical Theory of Cryptography" dated Sept. 1, 1945, which has now been declassified.

¹ Shannon, C. E., "A Mathematical Theory of Communication," *Bell System Technical Journal*, July 1948, p. 379; Oct. 1948, p. 623.

² See, for example, H. F. Gaines, "Elementary Cryptanalysis," or M. Givierge, "Cours de Cryptographie."

New Directions in Cryptography

Invited Paper

WHITFIELD DIFFIE AND MARTIN E. HELLMAN, MEMBER, IEEE

Abstract—Two kinds of contemporary developments in cryptography are examined. Widening applications of teleprocessing have given rise to a need for new types of cryptographic systems, which minimize the need for secure key distribution channels and supply the equivalent of a written signature. This paper suggests ways to solve these currently open problems. It also discusses how the theories of communication and computation are beginning to provide the tools to solve cryptographic problems of long standing.

I. INTRODUCTION

WE STAND TODAY on the brink of a revolution in cryptography. The development of cheap digital hardware has freed it from the design limitations of mechanical computing and brought the cost of high grade cryptographic devices down to where they can be used in such commercial applications as remote cash dispensers and computer terminals. In turn, such applications create a need for new types of cryptographic systems which minimize the necessity of secure key distribution channels and supply the equivalent of a written signature. At the same time, theoretical developments in information theory and computer science show promise of providing provably secure cryptosystems, changing this ancient art into a science.

The development of computer controlled communication networks promises effortless and inexpensive contact between people or computers on opposite sides of the world, replacing most mail and many excursions with telecommunications. For many applications these contacts must be made secure against both eavesdropping and the injection of illegitimate messages. At present, however, the solution of security problems lags well behind other areas of communications technology. Contemporary cryptography is unable to meet the requirements, in that its use would impose such severe inconveniences on the system users, as to eliminate many of the benefits of teleprocessing.

Manuscript received June 3, 1976. This work was partially supported by the National Science Foundation under NSF Grant ENG 10173. Portions of this work were presented at the IEEE Information Theory Workshop, Lenox, MA, June 23-25, 1975 and the IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory in Ronneby, Sweden, June 21-24, 1976.

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The best known cryptographic problem is that of privacy: preventing the unauthorized extraction of information from communications over an insecure channel. In order to use cryptography to insure privacy, however, it is currently necessary for the communicating parties to share a key which is known to no one else. This is done by sending the key in advance over some secure channel such as private courier or registered mail. A private conversation between two people with no prior acquaintance is a common occurrence in business, however, and it is unrealistic to expect initial business contacts to be postponed long enough for keys to be transmitted by some physical means. The cost and delay imposed by this key distribution problem is a major barrier to the transfer of business communications to large teleprocessing networks.

Section III proposes two approaches to transmitting keying information over public (i.e., insecure) channels without compromising the security of the system. In a *public key cryptosystem* enciphering and deciphering are governed by distinct keys, E and D , such that computing D from E is computationally infeasible (e.g., requiring 10^{100} instructions). The enciphering key E can thus be publicly disclosed without compromising the deciphering key D . Each user of the network can, therefore, place his enciphering key in a public directory. This enables any user of the system to send a message to any other user enciphered in such a way that only the intended receiver is able to decipher it. As such, a public key cryptosystem is a multiple access cipher. A private conversation can therefore be held between any two individuals regardless of whether they have ever communicated before. Each one sends messages to the other enciphered in the receiver's public enciphering key and deciphers the messages he receives using his own secret deciphering key.

We propose some techniques for developing public key cryptosystems, but the problem is still largely open.

Public key distribution systems offer a different approach to eliminating the need for a secure key distribution channel. In such a system, two users who wish to exchange a key communicate back and forth until they arrive at a key in common. A third party eavesdropping on this exchange must find it computationally infeasible to compute the key from the information overheard. A possible solution to the public key distribution problem is given in Section III, and Merkle [1] has a partial solution of a different form.

A second problem, amenable to cryptographic solution, which stands in the way of replacing contemporary busi-

Course Structure

Symmetric key cryptography

(Alice and Bob have a common key)

Public Key Cryptography

(Alice and Bob *do not* have a common key)

Advanced topics

(For instance, Alice does not fully trust Bob)

Food for Thought

Can you come up with a cipher where you can say something provable about confidentiality?

If yes, how big are the keys in your cipher?

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cryptography

Next time:

First example of an encryption scheme